1	Why does preregistration increase the persuasiveness of evidence? A Bayesian
2	rationalization
3	Aaron Peikert ^{1,2,3} , Maximilian S. Ernst ^{1, 4} , and & Andreas M. Brandmaier ^{1, 3, 5}
4	1 Center for Lifespan Psychology
5	Max Planck Institute for Human Development
6	Berlin
7	Germany
8	2 Department of Imaging Neuroscience
9	University College London
10	London
11	UK
12	3 Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research
13	Berlin
14	Germany
15	⁴ Max Planck School of Cognition
16	Leipzig
17	Germany
18	5 Department of Psychology
19	MSB Medical School Berlin
20	Berlin

21	Germany
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31	
32	The authors made the following contributions. Aaron Peikert: Conceptualization,
33	Writing—Original Draft Preparation, Writing—Review & Editing, Methodology, Formal
34	analysis, Software, Visualization, Project administration; Maximilian S. Ernst:
35	Writing—Review & Editing, Formal analysis, Validation; Andreas M. Brandmaier:
36	Writing—Review & Editing, Supervisions.
37	Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aaron Peikert,
38	Center for Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee
39	94, 14195 Berlin, Germany. E-mail: peikert@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

Abstract

The replication crisis has led many researchers to preregister their hypotheses and data 41 analysis plans before collecting data. A widely held view is that preregistration is supposed 42 to limit the extent to which data may influence the hypotheses to be tested. Only if data 43 have no influence an analysis is considered confirmatory. Consequently, many researchers 44 believe that preregistration is only applicable in confirmatory paradigms. In practice, 45 researchers may struggle to preregister their hypotheses because of vague theories that 46 necessitate data-dependent decisions (aka exploration). We argue that preregistration 47 benefits any study on the continuum between confirmatory and exploratory research. To 48 that end, we formalize a general objective of preregistration and demonstrate that 49 exploratory studies also benefit from preregistration. Drawing on Bayesian philosophy of 50 science, we argue that preregistration should primarily aim to reduce uncertainty about the 51 inferential procedure used to derive results. This approach provides a principled 52 justification of preregistration, separating the procedure from the goal of ensuring strictly 53 confirmatory research. We acknowledge that knowing the extent to which a study is 54 exploratory is central, but certainty about the inferential procedure is a prerequisite for 55 persuasive evidence. Finally, we discuss the implications of these insights for the practice of 56 preregistration. 57

Keywords: preregistration; confirmation; exploration; hypothesis testing; Bayesian;
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⁶¹ Why does preregistration increase the persuasiveness of evidence? A Bayesian ⁶² rationalization

The scientific community has long pondered the vital distinction between 63 exploration and confirmation, discovery and justification, hypothesis generation and 64 hypothesis testing, or prediction and postdiction (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006; Nosek et al., 65 2018: Shmueli, 2010: Tukey, 1980). Despite the different names, it is fundamentally the 66 same dichotomy that is at stake here. There is a broad consensus that both approaches are 67 necessary for science to progress; exploration, to make new discoveries and confirmation, to 68 expose these discoveries to potential falsification, and assess empirical support for the 69 theory. However, mistaking exploratory findings for empirically confirmed results is 70 dangerous. It inflates the likelihood of believing that there is evidence supporting a given 71 hypothesis, even if it is false. A variety of problems, such as researchers' degrees of freedom 72 together with researchers' hindsight bias or naive p-hacking have led to such mistakes 73 becoming commonplace vet unnoticed for a long time. Recognizing them has led to a crisis 74 of confidence in the empirical sciences (Ioannidis, 2005), and psychology in particular 75 (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). As a response to the crisis, evermore researchers 76 preregister their hypotheses and their data collection and analysis plans in advance of their 77 studies (Nosek et al., 2018). They do so to stress the predictive nature of their registered 78 statistical analyses, often with the hopes of obtaining a label that marks the study as 79 "confirmatory". Indeed, rigorous application of preregistration prevents researchers from 80 reporting a set of results produced by an arduous process of trial and error as a simple 81 confirmatory story (Wagenmakers et al., 2012) while keeping low false-positive rates. This 82 promise of a clear distinction between confirmation and exploration has obvious appeal to 83 many who have already accepted the practice. Still, the majority of empirical researchers 84 do not routinely preregister their studies. One reason may be that some do not find that 85 the theoretical advantages outweigh the practical hurdles, such as specifying every aspect of 86 a theory and the corresponding analysis in advance. We believe that we can reach a greater 87

acceptance of preregistration by explicating a more general objective of preregistration that
benefits all kinds of studies, even those that allow data-dependent decisions.

One goal of preregistration that has received widespread attention is to clearly 90 distinguish confirmatory from exploratory research (Bakker et al., 2020; Mellor & Nosek, 91 2018; Nosek et al., 2018; Simmons et al., 2021; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). In such a 92 narrative, preregistration is justified by a confirmatory research agenda. However, two 93 problems become apparent under closer inspection. First, many researchers do not 94 subscribe to a purely confirmatory research agenda (Baumeister, 2016; Brandmaier et al., 95 2013; Finkel et al., 2017; Tukey, 1972). Second, there is no strict mapping of the categories 96 preregistered vs. non-preregistered onto the categories confirmatory vs. exploratory 97 research. 98

⁹⁹ Obviously, researchers can conduct confirmatory research without preregistration — ¹⁰⁰ though it might be difficult to convince other researchers of the confirmatory nature of ¹⁰¹ their research, that is, that they were free of cognitive biases, made no data-dependent ¹⁰² decisions, and so forth. The opposite, that is, preregistered but not strictly confirmatory ¹⁰³ studies, are also becoming more commonplace (Chan et al., 2004; Dwan et al., 2008; Silagy ¹⁰⁴ et al., 2002).

This is the result of researchers applying one of two strategies to evade the 105 self-imposed restrictions of preregistrations: writing a loose preregistration to begin with 106 (Stefan & Schönbrodt, 2023) or deviating from the preregistration afterward (Lakens, 2024). 107 The latter is a frequent occurrence and, perhaps more worryingly, often remains 108 undisclosed (Akker et al., 2023; Claesen et al., 2021). Both strategies may be used for 109 sensible scientific reasons or with the self-serving intent of generating desirable results. 110 Thus, insisting on equating preregistration and confirmation has led to the criticism that, 111 all things considered, preregistration is actually harmful and neither sufficient nor 112 necessary for doing good science (Pham & Oh, 2021; Szollosi et al., 2020). 113

We argue that such criticism is not directed against preregistration itself but against 114 a justification through a confirmatory research agenda (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). When 115 researchers criticize preregistration as being too inflexible to fit their research question, 116 they often simply acknowledge that their research goals are not strictly confirmatory. 117 Forcing researchers into adopting a strictly confirmatory research agenda does not only 118 imply changing how they investigate a phenomenon but also what research questions they 119 pose. However reasonable such a move is, changing the core beliefs of a large community is 120 much harder than convincing them that a method is well justified. We, therefore, attempt 121 to disentangle the *methodological* goals of preregistration from the *ideological* goals of 122 confirmatory science. It might well be the case that psychology needs more confirmatory 123 studies to progress as a science. However, independently of such a goal, preregistration can 124 be useful for any kind of study on the continuum between strictly confirmatory and fully 125 exploratory. 126

To form such an objective for preregistration, we first introduce some tools of Bayesian philosophy of science and map the exploration/confirmation distinction onto a dimensional quantity we call "theoretical risk" (a term borrowed from Meehl, 1978, but formalized as the probability of proving a hypothesis wrong if it does not hold).

We are interested in why preregistrations should change researchers' evaluation of 131 evidence. Applying a Bayesian framework allows us to investigate our research question 132 most straightforwardly because it directly deals with what we ought to believe, given the 133 evidence presented. Specifically, it allows us to model changes in subjective degrees of 134 belief due to preregistration or, more simply, "persuasion". Please note that our decision to 135 adopt a Bayesian philosophy of science does not make assumptions about the statistical 136 methods researchers use. In fact, this conceptualization is intentionally as minimal as 137 possible to be compatible with a wide range of philosophies of science and statistical 138 methods researchers might subscribe to. One feature of the Bayesian framework, is the 139

strong emphasis on subjective yet rational judgement. Therefore, we assume that 140 researchers will differ significantly in how they value evidence but that by making 141 assumptions about the general process, we can make general statements that apply to all 142 these subjective evaluations. However, we should note that Popperians would be appalled 143 that we are content with positive inductive inferences (but we regard "failing to disprove" 144 as too limited), and Neopopperians would flinch that we assign probabilities to beliefs (we 145 are fond of calculating things). While the latter move is not strictly necessary it allows us 146 to connect the more abstract considerations more closely with what researchers believe. 147

Now, we outline two possible perspectives on the utility of preregistration. The first 148 one corresponds to the traditional application of preregistration to research paradigms that 149 focus on confirmation by maximizing the theoretical risk or, equivalently, by limiting type-I 150 error (when dichotomous decisions about theories are an inferential goal). We argue that 151 this view on the utility of preregistration can be interpreted as maximizing theoretical risk, 152 which otherwise may be reduced by researchers' degrees of freedom, p-hacking, and suchlike. 153 The second interpretation is our main contribution: We argue that contrary to the classic 154 view, the objective of preregistration is *not* the maximization of theoretical risk but rather 155 the minimization of uncertainty about the theoretical risk. This interpretation leads to a 156 broad applicability of preregistration to both exploratory and confirmatory studies. 157

To arrive at this interpretation, we rely on three arguments. The first is that 158 theoretical risk is vital for judging evidential support for theories. The second argument is 159 that the theoretical risk for a given study is generally uncertain. The third and last 160 argument is that this uncertainty is reduced by applying preregistration. We conclude that 161 because preregistration decreases uncertainty about the theoretical risk, which in turn 162 increases the amount of knowledge we gain from a particular study, preregistration is 163 potentially useful for any kind of study, no matter where it falls on the 164 exploratory-confirmatory continuum. 165

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Persuasion and the Bayesian rationale

If researchers plan to conduct a study, they usually hope that it will change their 167 assessment of some theory's verisimilitude (Niiniluoto, 1998). Moreover, they hope to 168 convince other researchers can be persuaded to change their believe in a theory as well. 169 Beforehand, researchers cannot know what evidence a study will provide but still must form 170 an expectation in order to decide about the specifics of a planned study, including if they 171 should preregister it. If they can expect that preregistration helps them to persuade other 172 researchers to change their believe, it is only rational to employ preregistration. To make 173 our three arguments, we must assume three things about what an ideal estimation process 174 entails and how it relates to what studies (preregistered vs not preregistered) to conduct. 175

1. Researchers judge the evidence for or against a hypothesis rationally.

177 2. They expect other researchers to apply a similar rational process.

3. Researchers try to maximize the expected persuasiveness for *other* researchers.

The assumption of rationality can be connected to Bayesian reasoning and leads to 179 our adoption of the framework. Our rationale is as follows. Researchers who decide to 180 conduct a certain study are actually choosing a study to bet on. They have to "place the 181 bet" by conducting the study by investing resources and stand to gain evidence for or 182 against a theory with some probability. This conceptualization of choosing a study as a 183 betting problem allows us to apply a "Dutch book" argument (Christensen, 1991). This 184 argument states that any better must follow the axioms of probability to avoid being 185 "irrational," i.e., accepting bets that lead to sure losses. Fully developing a Dutch book 186 argument for this problem requires careful consideration of what kind of studies to include 187 as possible bets, defining a conversion rate from the stakes to the reward, and modeling 188 what liberties researchers have in what studies to conduct. Without deliberating these 189 concepts further, we find it reasonable that researchers should not violate the axioms of 190 probability if they have some expectation about what they stand to gain with some 191

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likelihood from conducting a study. The axioms of probability are sufficient to derive the
Bayes formula, on which we will heavily rely for our further arguments. The argument is
not sufficient, however, to warrant conceptualizing persuasiveness in terms of posterior
probability; that remains a leap of faith. In fact, persuasiveness depends on how other
researchers weigh evidence which differs between individuals.

However, the argument applies to any reward function that satisfies the "statistical relevancy condition" (Fetzer, 1974; Salmon, 1970), that is, evidence only increases believe for a theory if the evidence is more likely to be observed under the theory than under the alternative. In particular, "diagnosticity" (Fiedler, 2017; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019), a concept highlighted in recent psychological literature, seems to adhere to the statistical relevancy condition.

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Theoretical risk

Our first argument is that theoretical risk is crucial for judging the persuasiveness of evidence. Put simply, risky predictions create persuasive evidence if they turn out to be correct. This point is crucial because we attribute much of the appeal of a confirmatory research agenda to this notion.

Let us make some simplifying assumptions and define our notation. To keep the notation simple, we restrict ourselves to evidence of a binary nature (either it was observed or not). We denote the probability of a hypothesis before observing evidence as P(H) and its complement as $P(\neg H) = 1 - P(H)$. The probability of observing evidence under some hypothesis is P(E|H). We can calculate the probability of the hypothesis after observing the evidence with the help of the Bayes formula:

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(E)}$$
(1)

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The posterior probability P(H|E) is of great relevance since it is often used directly

or indirectly as a measure of confirmation of a hypothesis. In the tradition of Carnap, in its 215 direct use, it is called *confirmation as firmness*; in its relation to the a priori probability 216 P(H), it is called *increase in firmness* (Carnap, 1950, preface to the 1962 edition). We 217 concentrate on the posterior probability because of its simplicity but take it only as one 218 example of a possible measure. In reality, researchers surely differ in what function they 219 apply to judge evidence and it is often most fruitful to compare more than two competing 220 hypotheses. The goal is therefore to reason about the space of possible measures 221 researchers might apply. However, since any measure fulfilling the statistical relevancy 222 condition increases monotonically with an increase in posterior probability P(H|E), we 223 might well take it to illustrate our reasoning. 224

In short, we want to increase posterior probability P(H|E). Increases in posterior 225 probability P(H|E) are associated with increases in persuasiveness, of which we want to 226 maximize the expectation. So how can we increase posterior probability? The Bayes 227 formula yields three components that influence confirmation, namely P(H), P(E|H) and 228 P(E). The first option leads us to the unsurprising conclusion that higher a priori 229 probability P(H) leads to higher posterior probability P(H|E). If a hypothesis is more 230 probable to begin with, observing evidence in its favor will result in a hypothesis that is 231 more strongly confirmed, all else being equal. However, the prior probability of a 232 hypothesis is nothing our study design can change. The second option is equally 233 reasonable; that is, an increase in P(E|H) leads to a higher posterior probability P(H|E). 234 P(E|H) is the probability of obtaining evidence for a hypothesis when it holds. We call 235 this probability of detecting evidence, given that the hypothesis holds "detectability." 236 Consequently, researchers should ensure that their study design allows them to find 237 evidence for their hypothesis, in case it is true. When applied strictly within the bounds of 238 null hypothesis testing, detectability is equivalent to power (or the complement of type-II 239 error rate). However, while detectability is of great importance for study design, it is not 240 directly relevant to what a preregistration is communicating to other researchers. We later 241

discuss how issues of detectability must be considered in a preregistration. Thus, P(E)remains to be considered. Since P(E) is the denominator, decreasing it can increase the posterior probability. In other words, high risk, high reward.

If we equate riskiness with a low probability of obtaining evidence (when the 245 hypothesis is false), the Bayesian rationale perfectly aligns with the observation that risky 246 predictions lead to persuasive evidence. This tension between high risk leading to high gain 247 is central to our consideration of preregistration. A high-risk, high-gain strategy is bound 248 to result in many losses that are eventually absorbed by the high gains. Sustaining many 249 "failed" studies is not exactly aligned with the incentive structure under which many, if not 250 most, researchers operate. Consequently, researchers are incentivized to appear to take 251 more risks than they actually do, which misleads their readers to give their claims more 252 credence than they deserve. It is at this juncture that the practice and mispractice of 253 preregistration comes into play. We argue that the main function of preregistration is to 254 enable proper judgment of the riskiness of a study. 255

To better understand how preregistrations can achieve that, let us take a closer look at the factors contributing to P(E). Using the law of total probability, we can split P(E)into two terms:

$$P(E) = P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)P(E|\neg H)$$
(2)

We have already noted that there is not much to be done about prior probability (P(H)), and hence its counter probability $P(\neg H)$), and that it is common sense to increase detectability P(E|H). The real lever to pull is therefore $P(E|\neg H)$. This probability tells us how likely it is that we find evidence in favor of the theory when in fact, the theory is not true. Its counter probability $P(\neg E|\neg H) = 1 - P(E|\neg H)$ is what we call "theoretical risk", because it is the risk a theory takes on in predicting the occurrence of particular evidence in its favor. We borrow the term from Meehl (1978), though he has not assigned it to the probability $P(\neg E | \neg H)$. Kukla (1990) argued that the core arguments in Meehl (1990) can be reconstructed in a purely Bayesian framework. However, while he did not mention $P(\neg E | \neg H)$ he suggested that Meehl (1978) used the term "very strange coincidence" for a small $P(E | \neg H)$ which would imply, that $P(\neg E | \neg H)$ can be related to or even equated to theoretical risk.

Let us note some interesting properties of theoretical risk $P(\neg E | \neg H)$. First, 271 increasing theoretical risk leads to higher posterior probability P(H|E), our objective. 272 Second, if the theoretical risk is smaller than detectability P(E|H) it follows that the 273 posterior probability must decrease when observing the evidence. If detectability exceeds 274 theoretical risk, the evidence is less likely under the theory than it is when the theory does 275 not hold (the inverse of statistical relevancy). Third, if the theoretical risk equals zero, then 276 posterior probability is at best equal to prior probability but only if detectability is perfect 277 (P(H|E) = 1). In other words, observing a sure fact does not lend credence to a hypothesis. 278

The last statement sounds like a truism but is directly related to Popper's seminal criterion of demarcation. He stated that if it is impossible to prove that a hypothesis is false $(P(\neg E | \neg H) = 0$, theoretical risk is zero), it cannot be considered a scientific hypothesis (Popper, 2002, p. 18). We note these relations to underline that the Bayesian rationale we apply here is able to reconstruct many commonly held views on how "risky" predictions are valued (but we of course differ from Popper on the central role of induction in science).

Both theoretical risk $P(\neg E | \neg H)$ and detectability P(E|H) aggregate countless influences; otherwise, they could not model the process of evidential support for theories. To illustrate the concepts we have introduced here, consider the following example of a single theory and three experiments that may test it. The experiments were created to illustrate how they may differ in their theoretical risk and detectability. Suppose the primary theory is about the cognitive phenomenon of "insight." For the purpose of

291	illustration, we define it, with quite some hand-waving, as a cognitive abstraction that
292	allows agents to consistently solve a well-defined class of problems. We present the
293	hypothesis that the following problem belongs to such a class of insight problems:
294	Use five matches (IIII) to form the number eight.
295	We propose three experiments that differ in theoretical risk and detectability. All
296	experiments take a sample of ten psychology students. We present the students with the
297	problem for a brief span of time. After that, the three experiments differ as follows:
298	1. The experimenter gives a hint that the problem is easy to solve when using Roman
299	numerals; if all students come up with the solution, she records it as evidence for the
300	hypothesis.
301	2. The experimenter shows the solution "VIII" and explains it; if all students come up
302	with the solution, she records it as evidence for the hypothesis.
303	3. The experimenter does nothing; if all students come up with the solution, she records
304	it as evidence for the hypothesis.
305	We argue that experiment 1 has high theoretical risk $P(\neg E_1 \neg H)$ and high
306	detectability $P(E_1 H)$. If "insight" has nothing to do with solving the problem $(\neg H)$, then
307	presenting the insight that Roman numerals can be used should not lead to all students
308	solving the problem $(\neg E_1)$; the experiment, therefore, has high theoretical risk
309	$P(\neg E_1 \neg H).$ Conversely, if insight is required to solve the problem $(H),$ then it is likely to
310	help all students to solve the problem (E_1) , the experiment, therefore, has high
311	detectability $P(E_1 H)$. The second experiment, on the other hand, has low theoretical risk
312	$P(\neg E_2 \neg H).$ Even if "insight" has nothing to do with solving the problem $(\neg H),$ there are
313	other plausible reasons for observing the evidence (E_2) , because the students could simply

and 2 differ in no obvious way. Experiment 3, however, also has low detectability. It is

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copy the solution without having any insight. With regard to detectability, experiments 1

unlikely that all students will come up with the correct solution in a short time (E_3) , even 316 if insight is required (H); experiment 3 therefore has low detectability $P(E_3|H)$. The 317 theoretical risk, however, is also low in absolute terms, but high compared to the 318 detectability (statistical relevancy condition is satisfied). In the unlikely event that all 10 319 students place their matches to form the Roman numeral VIII (E_3) , it is probably due to 320 insight (H) and not by chance $P(\neg E_3 | \neg H)$). Of course, in practice, we would allow the 321 evidence to be probabilistic, e.g., relax the requirement of "all students" to nine out of ten 322 students, more than eight, and so forth. 323

As mentioned earlier, the we restrict ourselves to binary evidence, to keep the mathematical notation as simple as possible. We discuss the relation between statistical methods and theoretical risk in the Statistical Methods section.

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Preregistration as a means to increase theoretical risk?

Having discussed that increasing the theoretical risk will increase the persuasiveness, it is intuitive to task preregistration with maximizing theoretical risk, i.e., a confirmatory research agenda. Indeed, limiting the type-I error rate is commonly stated as *the* central goal of preregistration (Nosek et al., 2018; Oberauer, 2019; Rubin, 2020). We argue that while such a conclusion is plausible, we must first consider at least two constraints that place an upper bound on the theoretical risk.

First, the theory itself limits theoretical risk: Some theories simply do not make 334 risky predictions, and preregistration will not change that. Consider the case of a 335 researcher contemplating the relation between two sets of variables. Suppose each set is 336 separately well studied, and strong theories tell the researcher how the variables within the 337 set relate. However, our imaginary researcher now considers the relation between these two 338 sets. For lack of a better theory, they assume that some relation between any variables of 339 the two sets exists. This is not a risky prediction to make in psychology (Orben & Lakens, 340 2020). However, we would consider it a success if the researcher would use the evidence 341

from this rather exploratory study to develop a more precise (and therefore risky) theory, e.g., by using the results to specify which variables from one set relate to which variables from the other set, to what extent, in which direction, with which functional shape, etc., to be able to make riskier predictions in the future. We will later show that preregistration increases the degree of belief in the further specified theory, though it remains low till being substantiated by testing the theory again. This is because preregistration increases the expected persuasiveness regardless of the theory being tested, as we will show.

Second, available resources limit theoretical risk. Increasing theoretical risk 349 $P(\neg E | \neg H)$ will usually decrease detectability P(E | H) unless more resources are invested. 350 This is similar to the well known tradeoff between type-I error rate and statistical power. 351 Tasking preregistration with an increase in theoretical risk makes it difficult to balance this 352 trade-off. Mindlessly maximizing theoretical risk would either never produce evidence or 353 require huge amounts of resources. As noted before, we strive for high detectability and 354 high theoretical risk in planning, conducting, and analyzing studies. Maximizing one at the 355 expense of the other is not necessarily beneficial for increasing persuasiveness but depends 356 on the specific function they apply to judge evidence and their specific location on the 357 curve. One advantage of our framework is that researchers can employ it to balance the 358 trade-off more effectively assuming they are willing to make some simplifying assumptions. 359

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Uncertainty about theoretical risk

We have established that higher theoretical risk leads to more persuasive evidence. In other words, we have reconstructed the interpretation that preregistrations supposedly work by restricting the researchers, which in turn increases the theoretical risk (or equivalently limits the type-I error rate) and thereby creates more compelling evidence. Nevertheless, there are trade-offs for increasing theoretical risk. Employing a mathematical framework allows us to navigate the trade-offs more effectively and move towards a second, more favorable interpretation. To that end, we incorporate uncertainty about theoretical ³⁶⁸ risk into our framework.

369 Statistical methods

One widely known factor is the contribution of statistical methods to theoretical 370 risk. Theoretical risk $P(\neg E | \neg H)$ is deeply connected with statistical methods, because it is 371 related to the type-I error rate in statistical hypothesis testing $P(E|\neg H)$ by 372 $P(\neg E | \neg H) = 1 - P(E | \neg H)$, if you consider the overly simplistic case where the research 373 hypothesis is equal to the statistical alternative-hypothesis because then the nill-hypothesis 374 is $\neg H$. Because many researchers are familiar with the type-I error rate, it can be helpful 375 to remember this connection to theoretical risk. Researchers who choose a smaller type-I 376 error rate can be more sure of their results, if significant, because the theoretical risk is 377 higher. However, this connection should not be overinterpreted for two reasons. First, 378 according to most interpretations of null hypothesis testing, the absence of a significant 379 result should not generally be interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis (Mayo, 2018, 380 p. 5.3). Second, the research hypothesis rarely equals the statistical alternative hypothesis 381 (most research hypothesis are more specific than "any value except zero"). In fact, it is 382 entirely possible to assume the null hypothesis as a research hypothesis, as is commonly 383 done in e.g., structural equation modelling, where the roles of detectability, theoretical risk 384 and type-I/II error rate switch. We argue that theoretical risk (and hence its complement, 385 $P(E|\neg H)$) also encompasses factors outside the statistical realm, most notably the study 386 design and broader analytical strategies. Type-I error rate is the property of a statistical 387 test under some assumptions, whereas theoretical risk is a researchers' belief. One may 388 take such theoretical properties as a first starting point to form a substantive belief but 389 surely researchers ought to take other factors into consideration. For example, if a 390 researcher believes that there might be confounding variables at play for the relation 391 between two variables, this should decrease theoretical risk; after all they might find an 392 association purely on account of the confounders (Fiedler, 2017). 393

Statistical methods stand out among these factors because we have a large and well-understood toolbox for assessing and controlling their contribution to theoretical risk. Examples of our ability to exert this control are the choice of type-I error rate, adjustments for multiple testing, the use of corrected fit measures (i.e., adjusted \mathbb{R}^2), information criteria, or cross-validation in machine learning. These tools help us account for biases in statistical methods that influence theoretical risk (and hence, $P(E|\neg H)$.

The point is that the contribution of statistical methods to theoretical risk can be 400 formally assessed. For many statistical models it can be analytically computed under some 401 assumptions. For those models or assumptions where this is impossible, one can employ 402 Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the contribution to theoretical risk. The precision with 403 which statisticians can discuss contributions to theoretical risk has lured the community 404 concerned with research methods into ignoring other factors that are much more uncertain. 405 We cannot hope to resolve this uncertainty; but we have to be aware of its implications. 406 These are presented in the following. 407

408 Sources of uncertainty

As we have noted, it is possible to quantify how statistical models affect the 409 theoretical risk based on mathematical considerations and simulation. However, other 410 factors in the broader context of a study are much harder to quantify. If one chooses to 411 focus only on the contribution of statistical methods to theoretical risk, one is bound to 412 overestimate it. Take, for example, a t-test of mean differences in two samples. Under ideal 413 circumstances (assumption of independence, normality of residuals, equal variance), it 414 stays true to its type-I error rate. However, researchers may do many very reasonable 415 things in the broader context of the study that affect theoretical risk: They might exclude 416 outliers, choose to drop an item before computing a sum score, broaden their definition of 417 the population to be sampled, translate their questionnaires into a different language, 418 impute missing values, switch between different estimators of the pooled variance, or any 419

number of other things. All of these decisions carry a small risk that they will increase the 420 likelihood of obtaining evidence despite the underlying research hypothesis being false. 421 Even if the t-test itself perfectly maintains its type I error rate, these factors influence 422 $P(E|\neg H)$. While, in theory, these factors may leave $P(E|\neg H)$ unaffected or even decrease 423 it, we argue that this is not the case in practice. Whether researchers want to or not, they 424 continuously process information about how the study is going, except under strict 425 blinding. While one can hope that processing this information does not affect their 426 decision-making either way, this cannot be ascertained. Therefore, we conclude that 427 statistical properties only guarantee a lower bound for theoretical risk. The only thing we 428 can conclude with some certainty is that theoretical risk is not higher than what the 429 statistical model guarantees without knowledge about the other factors at play. 430

431 The effects of uncertainty

Before we ask how preregistration influences this uncertainty, we must consider the 432 implications of being uncertain about the theoretical risk. Within the Bayesian framework, 433 this is both straightforward and insightful. Let us assume a researcher is reading a study 434 from another lab and tries to decide whether and how much the presented results confirm 435 the hypothesis. As the researcher did not conduct the study (and the study is not 436 preregistered), they can not be certain about the various factors influencing theoretical risk 437 (researcher degrees of freedom). We therefore express this uncertainty about the theoretical 438 risk as a probability distribution Q of $P(E|\neg H)$ (remember that $P(E|\neg H)$ is related to 439 theoretical risk by $P(E|\neg H) = 1 - P(\neg E|\neg H)$, so it does not matter whether we consider 440 the distribution of theoretical risk or $P(E|\neg H)$). To get the expected value of P(H|E)441 that follows from the researchers' uncertainty about the theoretical risk, we can compute 442 the expectation using Bayes theorem: 443

$$\mathbb{E}_Q[P(H|E)] = \mathbb{E}_Q\left[\frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)P(E|\neg H)}\right]$$
(3)

Of course, the assigned probabilities and the distribution Q vary from study to 444 study and researcher to researcher (and even the measure of confirmation), but we can 445 illustrate the effect of uncertainty with an example. Assuming P(E|H) = 0.8 (relective of 446 the typically strived for power of 80%). Let us further assume that the tested hypothesis is 447 considered unlikely to be true by the research community before the study is conducted 448 (P(H) = 0.1) and assign a uniform distribution for $P(E|\neg H) \sim U([1 - \tau, 1])$ where τ is set 449 to $1 - \alpha$, reflecting our assumption that this term gives an upper bound for theoretical risk 450 $P(\neg E | \neg H)$. We chose this uniform distribution as it is the maximum entropy distribution 451 with support $[1 - \tau, 1]$ and hence conforms to our Bayesian framework (Giffin & Caticha, 452 2007). 453

With this, we derive the expected value of P(H|E) as


$$\mathbb{E}_{Q}[P(H|E)] = \mathbb{E}_{Q}\left[\frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)P(E|\neg H)}\right]$$
(4)

$$= \int_{[1-\tau,1]} \tau^{-1} \frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)P(E|\neg H)} \,\mathrm{d}P(E|\neg H) \tag{5}$$

$$= \frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(\neg H)\tau} \ln\left(\frac{P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)}{P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)(1-\tau)}\right)$$
(6)

Figure 1 shows exemplary the effect of theoretical risk (x-axis) on the posterior probability (y-axis) being certain (solid line) or uncertain (dashed line) about the theoretical risk of a study. Our expectation of the persuasiveness varies considerably depending on how uncertain we are about the theoretical risk a study took on. Mathematically, uncertainty about theoretical risk is expressed through the variance (or rather entropy) of the distribution. The increase in uncertainty (expressed as more entropic distributions) leads to a decreased expected persuasiveness.

The argument for a confirmatory research agenda is that by increasing theoretical risk we increase expected persuasiveness, i.e., moving to the right on the x-axis in Figure 1



Posterior Probability

Figure 1

Posterior probability (confirmation as firmness) as a function of theoretical risk τ , where τ is either certain (solid line) or maximally uncertain (dotted line).

increases posterior probability (on the y-axis). However, if a hypothesis in a certain study 463 has low theoretical risk, there is not much researchers can do about it. However, studies do 464 not only differ by how high the theoretical risk is but also by how certain the recipient is 465 about the theoretical risk. A study that has a very high theoretical risk (e.g., 1.00% chance 466 that if the hypothesis is wrong, evidence in its favor will be observed,) but has also 467 maximum uncertainty will result in a posterior probability of 21%, while the same study 468 with maximum certainty will result in 90% posterior probability. The other factors 469 (detectability, prior beliefs, measure of confirmation) and, therefore, the extent of the 470 benefit varies, of course, with the specifics of the study. Crucially, even studies with some 471 exploratory aspects benefit from preregistration, e.g., in this scenario with a $\tau = 0.80$ (false 472




Figure 2

— certain --- uncertain

Several measures for confirmation as an increase in firmness as a function of τ , where τ is either certain (solid line) or maximally uncertain (dotted line). Measures taken from Sprenger and Hartmann (2019), Table 1.3, p. 51.

⁴⁷³ positive rate of 0.20) moving from uncertain to certain increases the posterior from 0.15 to
⁴⁷⁴ 0.31. We find it helpful to calculate an example because of the nonlinear nature of the
⁴⁷⁵ evidence functions.

⁴⁷⁶ Preregistration as a means to decrease uncertainty about the theoretical risk

We hope to have persuaded the reader to accept two arguments: First, the theoretical risk is important for judging evidential support for theories. Second, the theoretical risk is inherently uncertain, and the degree of uncertainty diminishes the persuasiveness of the gathered evidence. The third and last argument is that preregistrations reduce this uncertainty. Following the last argument, a preregistered study is represented by the solid line (certainty about theoretical risk), and a study that was not ⁴⁸³ preregistered is more similar to the dashed line (maximally uncertain about theoretical
⁴⁸⁴ risk) in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

485 Let us recall our three assumptions:

⁴⁸⁶ 1. Researchers judge the evidence for or against a hypothesis rationally.

487 2. They expect other researchers to apply a similar rational process.

⁴⁸⁸ 3. Researchers try to maximize the expected persuasiveness for other researchers.

The point we make with these assumptions is that researchers aim to persuade 489 other researchers, for example, the readers of their articles. Not only the original authors 490 are concerned with the process of weighing evidence for or against a theory but really the 491 whole scientific community the study authors hope to persuade. Unfortunately, readers of a 492 scientific article (or, more generally, any consumer of a research product) will likely lack 493 insight into the various factors that influence theoretical risk. While the authors 494 themselves may have a clear picture of what they did and how it might have influenced the 495 theoretical risk they took, their readers have much greater uncertainty about these factors. 496 In particular, they never know which relevant factors the authors of a given article failed to 497 disclose, be it intentionally or not. From the perspective of the ultimate skeptic, they may 498 claim maximum uncertainty. 490

Communicating clearly how authors of a scientific report collected their data and 500 consequently analyzed it to arrive at the evidence they present is crucial for judging the 501 theoretical risk they took. Preregistrations are ideal for communicating just that because 502 any description after the fact is prone to be incomplete. For instance, the authors could 503 have opted for selective reporting, that is, they decided to exclude a number of analytic 504 strategies they tried out. That is not to say that every study that was not-preregistered 505 was subjected to practices of questionable research practices. The point is that we cannot 506 exclude it with certainty. This uncertainty is drastically reduced if the researchers have 507

described what they intended to do beforehand and then report that they did exactly that.
In that case, readers can be certain they received a complete account of the situation.
They still might be uncertain about the actual theoretical risk the authors took, but to a
much smaller extent than if the study would not have been preregistered.

The remaining sources of uncertainty might be unfamiliarity with statistical methods or experimental paradigms used, the probability of an implementation error in the statistical analyses, a bug in the software used for analyses, etc. To further reduce the uncertainty about theoretical risk, researchers must therefore publish code and ideally data. After all, computational reproducibility is only possible if the data analytic procedure was communicated clearly enough to allow others to retrace the computational steps (Peikert & Brandmaier, 2021).

In any case, a well-written preregistration should aim to reduce the uncertainty about the theoretical risk and hence increase the persuasiveness of evidence. Therefore, a study that perfectly adhered to its preregistration will resemble the solid line in Figure 1/2. Crucially, perfect means here that the theoretical risk can be judged with low uncertainty, not that the theoretical risk is necessarily high.

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Hacking, harking, and other harms

The importance of distinguishing between low and highly uncertain theoretical risk becomes perhaps clearer if we consider a few hypothetical cases for illustration.

- ⁵²⁷ 1. We know with absolute certainty that researchers will revert to p-hacking to create
 ⁵²⁸ evidence that is favorable for the theory.
- ⁵²⁹ 2. A hypothesis was picked to explain reported results after the fact (HARKing, Kerr,
 ⁵³⁰ 1998).

⁵³¹ 3. We cannot exclude the possibility of p-hacking having led to the reported results.

4. Reported results were obtained by planned exploration.

533 5. Reported results were obtained by unplanned exploration.

In case 1, there is no theoretical risk $(P(\neg E | \neg H) = 0)$. If we know that the results 534 will be engineered to support the hypothesis no matter what, there is no reason to collect 535 data. A prime example of this case is the p_{ointless} metric (Hussey, 2021). Case 2 has a 536 similar problem. After all, the hypothesis that it had to happen the way it did happen is 537 irrefutable. In fact, both cases should be problematic to anyone who subscribes to the 538 statistical relevancy condition because if we choose the hypothesis in accordance with the 539 data or vice versa, without restrictions, they are not related anymore (i.e., observing the 540 data does not tell us anything about the hypothesis and the other way around). Case 3 is 541 different since here the theoretical risk is not necessarily low but simply uncertain (and 542 perhaps best represented by the dotted line in Figure 1/2). In case 4, the theoretical risk is 543 neither zero (unless the researcher plans to do run variations of analyses until a favourable 544 outcome is obtained, then we have a particular instance case of 1) nor high (as this is the 545 nature of exploratory approaches). However, we can take advantage of computational 546 reproducibility, use statistical properties, simulation or resampling methods, together with 547 scientific reasoning, to get a reasonably certain evaluation of the theoretical risk. Low 548 uncertainty about high theoretical risk is a somewhat favourable position (i.e., close to the 549 solid line in Figure 1/2). This favorable position leads us to recommend preregistration of 550 exploratory studies. Case 5 shares the neither zero nor high theoretical risk of case 4 but 551 has additional uncertainty about how much exploration was going on (how hard exactly 552 did the researchers try to come up with favourable results). Its low and uncertain 553 theoretical risk make it difficult to produce compelling evidence. 554

555

Discussion

To summarize, we showed that both higher theoretical risk and lower uncertainty about theoretical risk lead to higher persuasiveness across a variety of measures. The former result that increasing theoretical risk leads to higher expected persuasiveness

reconstructs the appeal and central goal of preregistration of confirmatory research 559 agendas. However, theoretical risk is something researchers have only limited control over. 560 For example, theories are often vague and ill-defined, resources are limited, and increasing 561 theoretical risk usually decreases detectability of a hypothesized effect (a special instance of 562 this trade-off is the well-known tension between type-I error and statistical power). While 563 we believe that preregistration is always beneficial, it might be counterproductive to pursue 564 high theoretical risk if the research context is inappropriate for strictly confirmatory 565 research. Specifically, appropriateness here entails the development of precise theories and 566 the availability of necessary resources (often, large enough sample size, but also see 567 Brandmaier et al. (2015)) to adequately balance detectability against theoretical risk. 568

In terms of preparing the conditions for confirmatory research, preregistration may 569 at most help to invest some time into developing more specific, hence riskier, implications 570 of a theory. But for a confirmatory science, it will not be enough to preregister all studies. 571 This undertaking requires action from the whole research community (Lishner, 2015). 572 Incentive structures must be created to evaluate not the outcomes of a study but the rigor 573 with which it was conducted (Cagan, 2013; Schönbrodt et al., 2022). Journal editors could 574 encourage theoretical developments that allow for precise predictions that will be tested by 575 other researchers and be willing to accept registered reports (Fried, 2020a, 2020b; van 576 Rooij & Baggio, 2021, 2020). Funding agencies should demand an explicit statement about 577 theoretical risk in relation to detectability and must be willing to provide the necessary 578 resources to reach adequate levels of both (Koole & Lakens, 2012). 579

Theoretical risk may conceptually be related to the framework of "severity" (Mayo, 2018; Mayo & Spanos, 2011). Severity, is a Neopopperian view which asserts that there is evidence for a hypothesis just to the extent that it survives stringent scrutiny. However, there are crucial differences between the two. First, our perspective on theoretical risk is not primarily concerned with avoiding inductive reasoning but with subjective changes of

belief. This is important because, while severity is calculable, it remains unclear how 585 severity should be valued, e.g. if an increase in severity from .80 to .81 should be as 586 impressive as from .99 to .999. Second, severity considerations are mainly after the fact. 587 Severity, a measure with which we can rule out alternative explanations, can only be 588 calculated after evidence was observed. This makes it difficult to guide a priori decisions in 589 planning a study, after all severity disregards power, if we observe evidence, and disregards 590 Type I error rate when we do not. This implies that for a priori balancing Type I and Type 591 II error rate, a researcher must assign a priori probabilities to, for example, the size of an 592 effect. Since such a move is not in line with frequentist rationale there is no guidelines 593 available on how to do this. Third, we would argue that severity considerations assume full 594 information about how the evidence came about and hence imply axiomatically the need 595 for perfect preregistration. This comes down to frequentist understanding of probability as 596 the outcome of a well defined random experiments. When judging a particular study, a 597 frequentist, and hence a severe tester, may not assign probability to the event that the 598 researchers did, for example, p-hack. The lack of knowledge on the readers side does not 599 turn the p hacking into a random event of which we can calculate the long run frequency 600 aka frequentist probability. A severe test, hence, must assume that they know the Type I 601 and Type II error rate precisely. Full transparency, is hence assumed, and we can not 602 imagine many ways except preregistration that get close to this ideal. This assumptions 603 also makes it difficult to deal with less than perfect preregistrations and post-hoc changes 604 without appealing to principles outside the core philosophy of severity. One such approach 605 is Lakens (2024)' introduction of validity as an additional consideration to severity when 606 evaluating deviations from preregistrations. Interestingly, in this work he unconventionally 607 defines high severity as high P(E|H) and high $P(\neg E|\neg H)$, which is closer to definitions of 608 "diagnosticity" (Fiedler, 2017; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019) and falls under the broad 600 class of measures for evaluating evidence we consider here. Notably, the original definition 610 of severity does not satisfy the statistical relevancy condition and is not such a measure; 611

⁶¹² Mayo (2018), p. 14:

Severity Principle (strong): We have evidence for a claim C just to the extent it survives a stringent scrutiny. If C passes a test that was highly capable of findings flaws or discrepancies from C, and yet none or few are found, the passing result, x, is evidence for C.

However, there also are communalities between our approach and severity, like the strong emphasis on counterfactual consideration (imagining the hypothesis was false), and there are even proposals to reconcile Bayesian and severity considerations (van Dongen et al., 2023).

Our latter result, on the importance of preregistration for minimizing uncertainty, 621 has two important implications. The first is, that even if all imaginable actions regarding 622 promoting higher theoretical risk are taken, confirmatory research should be preregistered. 623 Otherwise, the uncertainty about the theoretical risk will diminish the advantage of 624 confirmatory research. Second, even under less-than-ideal circumstances for confirmatory 625 research, preregistration is beneficial. Preregistering exploratory studies increases the 626 expected persuasiveness by virtue of reducing uncertainty about theoretical risk. 627 Nevertheless, exploratory studies will have a lower expected persuasiveness than a more 628 confirmatory study if both are preregistered and have equal detectability. 629

Focusing on uncertainty reduction also explains two common practices of preregistration that do not align with a confirmatory research agenda. First, researchers seldomly predict precise numerical outcomes, instead they use preregistrations to describe the process that generates the results. Precise predictions would have very high theoretical risk (they are likely incorrect if the theory is wrong). A statistical procedure may have high or low theoretical risk depending on the specifics of the model used. Specifying the process, therefore, is in line with the rationale we propose here, but is less reasonable when the goal ⁶³⁷ of preregistration is supposed to be a strictly confirmatory research agenda.

Second, researchers often have to deviate from the preregistration and make 638 data-dependent decisions after the preregistration. If the only goal of preregistration is to 639 ensure confirmatory research, such changes are not justifiable. However, under our rational, 640 some changes may be justified. Any change increases the uncertainty about the theoretical 641 risk and may even decrease the theoretical risk. The changes still may be worthwhile if the 642 negative outcomes may be offset by an increase in detectability due to the change. 643 Consider a preregistration that failed to specify how to handle missing values, and 644 researchers subsequently encountering missing values. In such case, detectability becomes 645 zero because the data cannot be analyzed without a post-hoc decision about how to handle 646 the missing data. Any such decision would constitute a deviation from the preregistration, 647 which is possible under our proposed objective. Note that a reader cannot rule out that the 648 researchers leveraged the decision to decrease theoretical risk, i.e., picking among all 640 options the one that delivers the most beneficial results for the theory (in the previous 650 example, chosing between various options of handling missing values). Whatever decision 651 they make, increased uncertainty about the theoretical risk is inevitable and the expected 652 persuasiveness is decreased compared to a world where they anticipated the need to deal 653 with missing data. However, it is still justified to deviate. After all they have not 654 anticipated the case and are left with a detectability of zero. Any decision will increase 655 detectability to a non-zero value offsetting the increase in uncertainty. The researchers also 656 may do their best to argue that the deviation was not motivated by increasing theoretical 657 risk, thereby, decreasing the uncertainty. Ideally, there is a default decision that fits well 658 with the theory or with the study design. Or, if there is no obvious candidate, the 659 researchers could conduct a multiverse analysis of the available options to deal with 660 missings to show the influence of the decision (Steegen et al., 2016). In any case, deviations 661 must be transparently reported and we applaud recent developments to standardize and 662 normalize this process (Willroth & Atherton, 2023). 663

As explained above, reduction in uncertainty as the objective for preregistration 664 does not only explain some existing practice, that does not align with confirmation as a 665 goal, it also allows to form recommendations to improve the practice of preregistration. 666 Importantly, we now have a theoretical measure to gauge the functionality of 667 preregistrations, which can only help increase its utility. In particular, a preregistration 668 should be specific about the procedure that is intended to generate evidence for a theory. 660 Such a procedure may accommodate a wide range of possible data, i.e., it may be 670 exploratory. The theoretical risk, however low, must be communicated clearly. Parts of the 671 process left unspecified imply uncertainty, which preregistration should reduce. However, 672 specifying procedures that can be expected to fail will lead to deviation and, subsequently, 673 to larger uncertainty. 674

Our emphasis on transparency aligns with other justifications of preregistration, 675 especially those put forth by Lakens (2019)'s, although based on quite different 676 philosophical foundations. Our goal is to contribute a rationale that more comprehensively 677 captures the spectrum of exploration and confirmation in relation to preregistrations, 678 post-hoc changes of preregistrations, and subjective evaluations of evidence. We find it 679 difficult to content ourselves with vague terms like "control" or "transparency" if they 680 ultimately remain unconnected to how much researchers believe in a theory. Within our 681 framework, researchers have the ability to input their assumptions regarding the 682 perspectives of other researchers and calculate the potential impact of their actions on their 683 readership, whether these actions relate to study design, to the preregistration itself, or 684 subsequent deviations from it. We put subjective evaluations at the center of our 685 considerations; we deal explicitly with researchers who are proponents of some theory (they 686 have higher priors for the theory being true), researchers who suspect confounding variables 687 (they assume lower theoretical risk), or those who remain doubtful if everything relevant 688 was reported (they have higher uncertainty about theoretical risk) or even those who place 689 greater value on incongruent evidence than others (they differ in their confirmation 690

⁶⁹¹ function). We, therefore, hope to not only provide a rationale for preregistration for those
⁶⁹² who subscribe to a Bayesian philosophy of science but also a framework to navigate the
⁶⁹³ complicated questions that arise in the practice of preregistration.

At the same time, approaching the evaluation of evidence using a Bayesian 694 formalism is far from novel (Fiedler, 2017; e.g., Kukla, 1990; Sprenger & Hartmann, 2019). 695 To our knowledge, it was not yet applied to the problem of preregistration. However, 696 Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2019) made use of the formalism to model the relation 697 between theory, hypothesis, and evidence. In the context of this conceptualization, they 698 discussed the usefulness of preregistration, though without applying the formalism there. 699 Most importantly, they are rather critical of the idea that preregistration has tangible 700 benefits. Instead, they prefer multiverse analyses but contend that those could be 701 preregistered if one fancies it. Their reasoning is based on two intuitions about what 702 should *not* influence the evaluation of evidence: temporal order and the mental state of the 703 originator. In our opinion, they disregard the temporal order a bit too hastily, as it is a 704 long-standing issue in Bayesian philosophy of science known as the "problem of old 705 evidence" (Chihara, 1987). However, we agree that not the temporal order is decisive but if 706 the researchers incorporated the information into the hypothesis the evidence is supposed 707 to confirm. For the other, we argue that the mental state of the originator does matter. 708 Suppose there are k = 1, 2, ..., K ways to analyze data, where each k has a $P(E_k | \neg H) > 0$. 709 If they intend to try each way after another but happen to be "lucky" on the first try and 710 stop, should we then apply $P(E|\neg H) = P(E_1|\neg H)$ or $P(E|\neg H) = P(E_1 \lor \ldots \lor E_k |\neg H)$? 711 We think the latter. However, this "Defeatist" intuition is not universally warranted and 712 depends on what we take H to mean specifically (Kotzen, 2013). Addressing, this problem 713 might benefit from combining Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2019)'s idea of updating on 714 two nested levels (theory-hypothesis layered on top of hypothesis-evidence) with our 715 approach to modelling uncertainty. 716

⁷¹⁷ Whatever the difference in evaluating preregistration as a tool, maybe conceptually ⁷¹⁸ more profound is that Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2019) conceptualizes

"discovery-oriented research" differently than we do "exploratory". They assume the same 719 theoretical risk $(P(\neg E | \neg H) = .05)$ and detectability (P(E | H)) = .8) in their calculation 720 example as we do but assign different prior probabilities, namely .06 for discovery versus .6 721 for theory testing. Then, they conclude that discovery-oriented researcher requires a much 722 lower type-I error rate to control false positive in light of the low prior probability. This 723 runs counter to our definition of exploratory research having low theoretical risk. Of course, 724 we agree that low priors require more persuasive evidence; our disagreement, therefore, lies 725 mainly in terminology. They imagine discovery-oriented researchers to conduct 726 experiments where they have low expectations that they obtain positive evidence 727 $(.06 \cdot .8 + .94 \cdot .05 = 0.095)$, but if they do, it raises the posterior significantly (from .06 to 728 .51) In our view, researchers who set out to explore a data set often find "something" (due 729 to low $P(\neg E | \neg H)$; therefore, it should only slightly raise your posterior if they do. On a 730 substantive matter, we believe both kinds of research are common in psychology. It is, 731 therefore, mostly a disagreement on terminology. This disagreement only highlights why 732 using a mathematical framework to investigate such things is so useful and ultimately 733 indispensable because we can clearly see where and how we differ in our reasoning. 734

We believe that our reasoning is quite similar to Höfler et al. (2022), who call for 735 transparent exploration using preregistration. We could be more sure of our agreement, if 736 they had formulated their arguments within a mathematical framework, which would also 737 have helped to dissolve an apparent conflict in their definitions of confirmation, exploration, 738 and transparency. On the one hand, they define "The principle difference between 739 confirmation and exploration is that confirmation adheres to an evidential norm for the 740 test of a hypothesis to pass.", but then suggest that transparent exploration can be 741 conducted using inferences tests as a filtering mechanism. Their distinction between 742 confirmation, intransparent and transparent exploration are otherwise just as well placed 743

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along the dimensions, theoretical risk and uncertainty about theoretical risk.

With the goal to facilitate rigorous exploration, we have proposed a workflow for 745 preregistration called *preregistration as code* (PAC) elsewhere (Peikert et al., 2021). In a 746 PAC, researchers use computer code for the planned analysis as well as a verbal description 747 of theory and methods for the preregistration. This combination is facilitated by dynamic 748 document generation, where the results of the code, such as numbers, figures, and tables, 749 are inserted automatically into the document. The idea is that the preregistration already 750 contains "mock results" based on simulated or pilot data, which are replaced after the 751 actual study data becomes available. Such an approach dissolves the distinction between 752 the preregistration document and the final scientific report. Instead of separate documents, 753 preregistration, and final report are different versions of the same underlying dynamic 754 document. Deviations from the preregistration can therefore be clearly (and if necessary, 755 automatically) isolated, highlighted, and inspected using version control. Crucially, because 756 the preregistration contains code, it may accommodate many different data patterns, i.e., it 757 may be exploratory. However, while a PAC does not limit the extent of exploration, it is 758 very specific about the probability to generate evidence even when the theory does not 759 hold (theoretical risk). Please note that while PAC is ideally suited to reduce uncertainty 760 about theoretical risk, other more traditional forms of preregistration are also able to 761 advance this goal. 762

Contrary to what is widely assumed about preregistration, a preregistration is not necessarily a seal of confirmatory research. Confirmatory research would almost always be less persuasive without preregistration, but in our view, preregistration primarily communicates the extent of confirmation, i.e., theoretical risk, of a study. Clearly communicating theoretical risk is important because it reduces the uncertainty and hence increases expected persuasiveness.

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774	Declarations
774 775	Declarations All code and materials required to reproduce this article are available under
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